Joe Mauer as the new John Olerud

Joe Mauer’s problem with bi-lateral leg weakness this year has led to him occasionally playing first base in order to get a break from behind the plate. Given the strong likelihood that this will continue not only this year but in subsequent years, a question arises: If Joe Mauer permanently stops catching for the Twins in the next year or two and becomes a first-baseman/third-baseman/corner-outfielder, how much value will he contribute in the future?

That’s where John Olerud comes in. Before looking at Mauer’s possible future contributions, we need to set a baseline, and Olerud appears to be a good one.

John Olerud was a 6’5”, 225 pound, sweet-swinging lefty first-baseman who won a batting title and walked more than he struck out. Joe Mauer is a 6’5”, 230 pound, sweet-swinging lefty catcher who’s won three batting titles and walks more than he strikes out. Given those similarities between the two, also consider each player’s average batting line from their age 22-27 seasons (for Olerud  ’91-’96, for Mauer ’05 to ’10):

• Mauer – age 22-27 averages: .328/.409/.478 with 12 HR, 76 RBI, 1.25 BB/K, 5.4 WAR in 576 PA
• Olerud – age 22-27 averages: .297/.399/.477 with 16 HR, 70 RBI, 1.29 BB/K, 3.9 WAR in 543 PA

Their numbers are quite similar. The OBP and SLG are only a few points apart and the BB/K ratio is almost identical. There are also a few small differences; Mauer has a 30-point edge in batting while Olerud averaged four more home runs. The largest statistical difference is WAR, where Mauer has a 1.5 win edge. That WAR gap is pretty siginifcant, but it’s partially due to Mauer playing a much tougher defensive position than Olerud. If you remove the positional advantage Mauer received as a catcher and add back what Olerud lost for being a first-baseman, Mauer would have a WAR of approximately 4.6 while Olerud would have a 4.5 WAR. So, from age 22 to 27, Mauer and Olerud made almost the exact same contribution to their respective teams, if you remove the positional adjustments.

The exception to the similarities has been Mauer’s age 28 season (2011).It has been marred by injuries and general soreness that has limited him to .287/.347/.349 with only 1 HR this year. Olerud hit .294/.400/489 with 22 HR in his age 28 year. However, if 2011 is ignored, Olerud is a safe baseline to use to answer the original question: If Joe Mauer permanently stops catching for the Twins in the next year or two and becomes a first-baseman/third-baseman/corner-outfielder, how much value will he contribute in the future?

Mauer’s currently in year one of an eight-year deal with the Twins. With seven seasons remaining after 2011, Olerud’s age 29 to 35 seasons should be a good point of comparison. In those seasons, not only was Olerud a solid contributor, but he also slightly improved his value as he was able to stay healthy. Take a look at his line:

• Olerud – age 29-35 averages: .297/.402/.457, with 17 HR, 89 RBI, 1.32 K/BB, 4.4 WAR in 650 PA

Along with a good eye and a sweet swing, one of the main keys to Olerud’s ability to maintain his value into his mid-thirties was getting more plate appearances by simply staying healthy. And that’s the point where the Twins are at with Joe. Do you try to get as much value from “Mauer the catcher” right now and possibly lose some or all of his contribution in years 6 to 8 of his contract? Or, do you take the steps after 2011 to move him to another position and get as much value as you can over the life of the contract? Even in Olerud’s age 33 to 35 seasons (years 6 to 8 of Mauer’s contract) he still averaged a 2.7 WAR. That value is a definite possibility if Mauer permanently moves from behind the plate soon; if he remains as a catcher, that level of contribution becomes a remote, and unlikely, possibility.

*All WAR values from FanGraphs.com

Tags: Joe Mauer, John Olerud, Minnesota Twins, New York Mets, Seattle Mariners, Toronto Blue Jays, WAR

WAR Games with Bill Smith after the Santana Trade

The recent trade of Delmon Young to the Tigers for two low-upside pitchers marks yet another failed move on the part of Bill Smith. Aside from the Jim Thome signing in 2010, just about every significant transaction by Bill Smith has had negative results. And as you look more into the details, many of those transactions can be traced back to the Johan Santana trade prior to the 2008 season.

First, it must be stated that Bill Smith can’t be faulted for trading Santana, as there was no way Johan was going to sign a long term extension in Minnesota. Where things went sour for Bill was choosing the wrong offer. This choice has sent the Twins on downward spiral that may eventually set them back a few years. Here’s the reason.

After a drawn out period of trade negotiations lasting a couple months, the Twins eventually accepted the Mets offer of Deolis Guerra, Carlos Gomez, Kevin Mulvey, and Phil Humber. At the time, those constituted the Mets’ #2, #3, #4, and #7 prospects, respectively, according to Baseball America. Gomez ended up spending two seasons with the Twins, playing great defense and not hitting much of anything. Humber and Mulvey both had short, unsuccessful cups of coffee with the Twins, while Guerra is still in the minors.

Now consider that prior to the Twins accepting the Mets offer, the Red Sox had created a package that centered around the Twins choosing between either Jon Lester or Jacoby Ellsbury. The Sox would also have included at least Justin Masterson and Jed Lowrie. But, Bill was greedy and wanted both Lester and Ellsbury in the deal. When the Sox continued to balk at that idea, the Twins chose the Mets offer. Imagine Lester fronting the Twins rotation or Ellsbury hitting in front of Denard Span and Joe Mauer. Instead, we have the start of the downward spiral.

To begin to give the spiral some value, let’s put some numbers behind the trade offers.

From 2008 to today, the WAR values of the two Boston proposals are:

• Proposal with Lester = 27.7 [Lester (14.6), Masterson (9.4), and Lowrie (3.7)]
• Proposal with Ellsbury (who missed most of 2010 with injury) = 22.0 [Ellsbury (8.9), Masterson (9.4), and Lowrie (3.7)]

Now, from 2008 to today, the Mets’ offer that the Twins accepted:

• WAR = 8.4 [Gomez (6.1), Humber (2.4), Mulvey (-0.1)]

You might look at those numbers and say “Wow, choosing the Mets offer over the Sox offer cost the Twins 13.6 wins (on the low end) and 18.6 wins (on the high end) since 2008.”But you’d be wrong. Those WAR values for Gomez, Humber, and Mulvey are for 2008 to today; the entire value cannot be contributed to the Twins as those three players had all left the Twins organization by 2010. If you just look at the WAR generated by those players while they were with the Twins, here’s what you get:

• WAR = 3.1 [Gomez (3.6), Humber (-0.4), Mulvey (-0.1)]

Now it looks like the Twins only got a return in WAR of 3.1. But that’s not the end of it…

After 2009 the Twins, tired of Gomez’s lack of growth at the plate, traded him to the Brewers for shortstop J.J. Hardy. Hardy was coming off a down year, but was a young, elite defender that previously had multiple seasons of 20+ homers. For the most part, the trade was welcomed by Twins fans, and for good reason.

Gomez continued to struggle at the plate with the Brewers while Hardy, though oft-injured last year, contributed solid defense and finished with a decent season for the Twins. The trade ended up in the Twins favor based upon the 2010 results, as Hardy finished with a WAR of 2.5 versus Gomez’s 0.8. So we continue tracing the WAR value and get:

• WAR upgrade = 1.7 [Hardy (2.5) – Gomez (0.8)]

Unfortunately for the Twins, it doesn’t end there. First, in a more minor move (at the time) the Twins let Phil Humber leave after the 2009. Humber bounced around and didn’t provide value until this year, where thus far he’s posted a 2.4 WAR with the White Sox. However, in fairness to the Twins, after they let him go he signed with both the Royals and the A’s, and neither saw value in Humber. So I’ll let this one slide.

The more egregious transaction was the trade of Hardy to the Orioles after 2010. With Ron Gardenhire’s desire to for the “speed game” the Twins traded Hardy to the Orioles for Jim Hoey, a middle reliever, and minor-leaguer Brett Jacobson.

Now, since Smith has moved Hardy, he needs a shortstop. Smith wins the bidding for Japanese infielder Tsuyoshi Nishioka (a guy with speed) and signs him to a three year deal. Thus far, both Hoey (-0.6) and Nishioka (-1.3) have been a disaster for the Twins, while Hardy has regained some of his old form and currently has 23 home runs and a WAR of 2.5. So, the WAR calculation on this transaction is:

• WAR downgrade = -4.4 [Nishioka + Hoey (-1.9) - Hardy (2.5)]

Summing that all together, the total WAR the Twins have received from trading Johan Santana is:

• WAR from Players in Santana Trade and Subsequent Moves: 0.4

That’s right, the players received in the trade of Johan Santana, and the subsequent moves involving those players, has resulted in less than half a win in three-plus years.

So, in summary, the Twins could have traded Santana to the Red Sox for a group of players headed by Jon Lester that currently has a WAR of 27.7 since 2008. Or, they could have accepted a deal headed by Ellsbury with a WAR of 22.0. Instead, as it currently stands, the Twins essentially traded Johan Santana for Jim Hoey, Tsuyoshi Nishioka, Deolis Guerra, and Brett Jacobson, with a 0.4 WAR in return. On the low end, that’s a difference of 21.6 wins over three years. On the high end, 27.3 wins over three years. And still counting.

To finish off the spiral, I can find no better quote than one from Theo Epstein in 2008 regarding the Santana rumours and the possibility of a trade:

“I think with some of the things we’re discussing, as an organization we all feel as if it’s a win-win,” Epstein said. “We’re in a great position regardless.

“I’ll issue the usual caveat, which I really believe in, that baseball is unpredictable and humbling. We might think we’re in a great position and five years from now we’ll look back and realize we were in a [bad] position and just didn’t know it.”

Unfortunately, it’s the Twins that are looking back.

*All WAR values from FanGraphs.com

Tags: Bill Smith, Boston Red Sox, Carlos Gomez, J.J. Hardy, Jacoby Ellsbury, Jim Hoey, Johan Santana, Jon Lester, New York Mets, Tsuyoshi Nishioka

Michael Cuddyer’s Success with Change-ups

Michael Cuddyer’s bounce-back 2011 season has been due in part to a pronounced success against change-ups. Cuddyer has always hit change-ups well; since 2004 his 2.77 wCH/C is the best in MLB. But 2011 is proving to be his best season yet.

Cuddyer currently has a wCH/C value of 5.86, second-best in MLB and up significantly from 1.93 in 2010. He’s hit 44% of his home runs (8 of 18) off of change-ups, even though he only sees that pitch 8.5% of the time.

There are a number of explanations for this jump in performance. One of those explanations is simply that he’s facing pitchers with poorer change-ups.

The average wCH/C value for all pitchers Cuddyer has faced in 2011 is -0.98. In 2010, the wCH/C value of all pitchers he faced was +0.23. The swing is 1.21 runs, meaning that Cuddyer’s results against change-ups should increase by that much simply on the decline of the change-up quality alone. And if you add in the fact that Cuddyer is one of the best change-up hitters in baseball, the effect of facing poorer quality change-ups could easily double the 1.21 run value.

So what does this mean? The fact that the change-ups Cuddyer’s faced have been lower quality just needs to be used as a point of caution when the Twins negotiate a new contract with him after this season. Sure he’s versatile, interacts well with fans, and is a good hitter. But his stats have been boosted by his favourite pitch to hit, and the Twins need to be mindful that Cuddyer’s numbers could fall if they face better change-up pitchers next year.

Tags: Change-up, Michael Cuddyer, Minnesota Twins

Getting the Right Return for Denard Span

A large number Twins fans are upset that the team may consider moving Denard Span.  Twins fans should support trading Span as long as it’s for the right return. That said, Twins GM Bill Smith has proven through previous trades that he’s inept at getting good value for his players. That’s why there’s considerable consternation against a rumored deal involving Span and Washington Nationals’ closer Drew Storen.

Last year the Nats were able to dump their closer, Matt Capps, on the Twins and get highly-touted prospect Wilson Ramos in return. This year it looks like they may have the Twins falling for the same gag. The old phrase that should be running through Bill Smith’s head right now is: “Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me.” The reason is that it appears as though Smith doesn’t understand the value of a “closer.” The Nationals do, and that’s the reason why they’re willing to give up their closer (again) for a high-value hitter.

Here’s the case: Span, currently out with a concussion, has been able to post a 2.6 WAR in only 255 PA’s, good for 21st amongst all outfielders*. In order to give that value some context, consider that Carlos Gonzalez has a 2.4 WAR (386 PA’s), Josh Hamilton has a 1.9 WAR (in 300 PA’s), and Nelson Cruz has a 1.7 WAR (in 357 PA’s). Span has been quite valuable this season.

Now consider the value of Drew Storen. He’s posted a 0.5 WAR, tying him for 56th amongst relievers. To give that some context, below are two important points (brought to you by the word “anywhere”):

1. Currently the top reliever in terms of WAR is Atlanta closer Craig Kimbrel, with a 2.4 WAR. This means that the top reliever in all of baseball right now has a WAR lower than that of a hitter who’s missed a significant chunk of time. The point? Yes, good relievers are absolutely necessary for a winning ballclub; you just can’t get anywhere close to the same contribution from them as you can from a very good hitter.

2. Twins reliever Glen Perkins currently has a 1.5 WAR, ranking him seventh amongst all MLB relievers. Repeat for effect: Glen Perkins currently has a 1.5 WAR, ranking him seventh amongst all MLB relievers. This is the same Glen Perkins that basically pitched himself out of the majors, spending most of ’10 in AAA. The point? Good relievers can turn up anywhere; you don’t give up very good hitters to get them.

Twins fans should support trading Denard Span, as long as the team can get the right return for him. In this case, getting this reliever as the centerpiece of this deal isn’t anywhere close to the right return.

*all WAR values from Fangraphs.com

Tags: Denard Span, Drew Storen, Glen Perkins, Minnesota Twins, Washington Nationals